Security questions.

No. The DawonAI web app encrypts saved chats on your device, with a key that only your account key unlocks, before uploading them. The relay stores only the encrypted copies.

DawonAI does serve the web app’s code, so a changed release could steal your key. How to check a release is below.

Yes. The model server reads each request in memory in order to answer it. DawonAI’s software on the model server writes no prompts or answers to disk. Someone controlling the model server while it runs could read requests and answers.

DawonAI keeps these on disk:

• On the relay, your account: your plan, its status and paid-until date, a hash of a key derived from your account key, Stripe’s subscription ID, and your devices with the days they were added and last used.
• On the relay, your saved chats, encrypted, under a vault ID with no account ID attached.
• On the relay, an encrypted backup of its database, made every day.
• On the model server, hourly error summaries with no request content, IP addresses, day passes or accounts, and with times rounded to the hour.

Neither server writes down IP addresses, prompts or answers. Two hardening steps on the model server aren’t done yet: turning swap off and encrypting its disk.

Delete everything in the DawonAI web app deletes your saved chats and your account, as two separate requests, then wipes that browser.

You can also choose to have the account deleted after 30, 90 or 365 days without use. Saved chats that nobody opens for 365 days are deleted.

Not through the day pass. The relay signs each day pass blind, so the relay can’t recognize it later, and the model server sees only that it’s valid. Requests can still be linked to you by:

• your IP address and the timing of your connections, which the relay sees
• what you write in a request
• the day pass itself, which ties one day’s requests from one device together
• patterns that stand out while there are few users: your plan, your coding harness, your working hours and the size of your requests
• in the web app, the vault ID your saved chats sync under

Your device collects tomorrow’s day pass at a random time today, so the relay can’t line up when a day pass was collected with when it’s used. On a device’s first day, or a day after it was off at that random time, the device collects the day pass when you first use it.

Yes, against the relay seeing your IP address. The relay sees the address of every connection: your account, your saved chats and your requests. Tor or a VPN keeps your own address from the relay.

Tor and VPNs don’t hide the other patterns above. Over Tor, the web app’s saved-chat sync still ties your sessions together across days.

Stripe takes your card and email when you pay, so Stripe knows who you are and that you paid DawonAI. The relay stores Stripe’s subscription ID with your account, so Stripe’s records and DawonAI’s together tie your account to you.

Paying by card links your account to you. It doesn’t link your account to your requests. Stripe never sees your requests or your chats.

If a browser is still logged in, open Account > Make a new key there. That browser can replace the account key without knowing the old one.

If no browser is logged in, DawonAI can’t recover the account, because DawonAI doesn’t know who you are. Linked pai computers keep working until they’re removed or expire, and a new account needs a new plan.

Cancel the plan from Stripe’s payment receipt email, so it doesn’t renew. Within 7 days of paying, email support with the order number from that receipt to get a refund. The refund policy has the details.

From another logged-in browser, remove the device in Devices, then make a new account key.

• Removing the device stops it collecting day passes. The day pass it already holds works until midnight UTC.
• A browser holds what it needs to download and decrypt your saved chats, so removing it isn’t enough. A new account key moves your saved chats to a new address the lost browser doesn’t know, and deletes the old one.
• A computer running pai holds no saved chats, so removing it is enough.

Yes, if you use Safari. Safari wipes the storage of sites that aren’t installed after 7 days without use, including the DawonAI web app’s keys. Add the DawonAI web app to your home screen.

Both reach the same model server. pai, the program for coding harnesses, does two things a browser can’t:

• pai checks the model server’s key on every connection, against keys built into each pai release, and sends nothing to a server with any other key. That stops someone who obtains a certificate for DawonAI’s API name, such as someone controlling the relay, from reading what your coding harness sends.
• Your coding harness talks to pai on your own computer, with a key that only works there. The coding harness never sees your account key or your day pass.

Browsers can’t check a server’s key this way. The DawonAI web app relies on rules about who can get a certificate for its name, described on the technical page. Saved chats are in the web app only. pai holds none.

DawonAI can hand over only what exists on its servers:

• account records on the relay, listed under “Do you log anything?” above
• saved chats, stored under vault IDs with no account ID, and encrypted with keys that stay on your devices
• the model server’s hourly error summaries

DawonAI’s software writes no prompts, answers or IP addresses to disk, so there are none on disk to hand over. Stripe holds your card details and email separately.

This describes what’s stored. It isn’t a promise about how any order would be handled.

DawonAI publishes a SHA-256 hash of every file in each web app release, from a different server than the app. Verify the app shows how to download the files the app server sends and compare them with that list.

A match shows what the server sent at the moment you checked. The web app loads no third-party scripts, so those files are everything the web app runs.

Planned:

• Keys for each device and each chat, so that removing a device is enough to cut it off from saved chats. Your account key would then only add a device or recover the account.
• On the model server: turning swap off, keeping system logs in memory only, full-disk encryption unlocked by hand after each boot, and AppArmor confinement for its containers.

Considered for after the first version:

• paying in Bitcoin through a self-hosted BTCPay Server
• approving new devices
• device keys stored in hardware
• newer credentials, now an IETF draft, that limit streams without a daily key